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CRIMINAL LAW
POST CONVICTION REMEDIES: ELIMINATING FEDERAL-STATE FRICTION
WARREN E. BURGER*
It is hardly news to the fifty lawyers who hold
the high office of Attorney General in each of the
States to be told that in recent years the federal
courts have been literally flooded with habeas
corpus cases from state prisoners. Many of you
have been drawn into this process. You know it
well. You do not like it. I do not like it. I know of
no federal judge who likes it. But it is the common
lot of federal and state judges to be required to
perform duties which as a matter of private choice,
or sound judicial administration, they would avoid.
The fact that most of these petitions have no
merit and that they constitute an undue burden on
the federal court system as well as on the states
which were required to respond in the federal proceeding is irrelevant. The burden is a fact.
This development has been sand, if not gravel,
in federal-state relationships, and the state courts
were not without basis in protesting that nothing
in the Constitution gave federal trial judges a
power of appellate review over state supreme
courts. Indeed, I think it is safe to say that the
vast majority of federal trial judges share this view.
As we look back we can see that the cumbersome
procedural nightmare which developed was never
intended even though it was inevitable. But it happened, and it is not something theoretical but a
hard, stubborn fact. As practitioners you know
that the important thing now is what we will do to
get this procedural nightmare under control.
Having tried to state this problem as it looks
from your side of the table, let me now put it from
the federal side. It can be simply stated. This tension is inherent in the nature of the federal system
as it now exists. It is our collective responsibility
to acknowledge these tensions and deal with them.
There is another factor and it is the human
* Chief Justice, United States Supreme Court.
This article is an adaptation of a speech made by
the Chief Justice to the National Association of Attorneys General on February 6, 1970.

aspect: prisoners like many other human beings
find it easy to believe they are victims of injustice.
This is all the more true when a person is denied
both his freedom and the amenities of life in a
prison which affords him little or nothing at all of
constructive activity or opportunity to improve
himself. Most of the two hundred thousand inmates of American prisons have no adequate programs for education or self-improvement. For them
filing petitions is often a form of therapy as some
people on the outside write letters-to-the-editor.
For nearly all of the past one hundred and eighty
years responsibility for the administration of
criminal justice has been regarded as the primary
responsibility of the states, jealously guarded as a
local matter no less, if not more, than any other.
We are now faced, and we could accurately say you
are confronted, with the fact that federally-imposed standards of procedure have become limitations on the states in the administration of criminal
justice. It serves no useful or practical purpose to
wish or even to agree that the improvement of
standards of fairness at every level of criminal
justice probably could have been accomplished as
swiftly and uniformly, and without friction and
tension, in some other way than the process of case
by case rule-making on the federal side without
notice to and participation in that process by those
affected-features which are generally regarded as
part of "due process" in rule-making. The history
of this tension and friction ought to teach us some
important lessons for the future, but now we must
deal with the situation as it is.
Beginning in 1963 the American Bar Association
embarked upon what has become perhaps the most
ambitious single undertaking in the history of that
great organization. The Criminal Justice Project
of the ABA sought to identify and restate appropriate standards for the administration of criminal
justice.
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I wish to talk about just one facet of the many
subjects dealt with in the American Bar Association
standards. That facet is the means of dealing with
post-conviction remedies and it will point the way
to eliminating tensions and frictions between the
state and federal courts.
I said earlier that this particular problem of
federally-imposed standards for post-conviction
remedies fell upon all of us in the period when state
legislatures, like the Congress, were harassed with
new and enlarged demands for more money and
enlarged programs. To have reached through all of
this to gain the attention of the lawmakers would
have required a powerful legislative program, and
we know that neither prisoners behind walls nor
judges in their courts have lobbyists to press their
legitimate claims on lawmakers.
It was in 1963 that the United States Supreme
Court in Townsend v. Sainz laid down the main
requirements of an adequate fact-finding process
for post-conviction claims based on a federal constitutional right. A claim addressed to a federal
court asserting denial of a federal constitutional
right in the state courts required the United States
District Judge to hold a full evidentiary hearing
into the prisoner's claim if the state had not provided such a hearing. The Supreme Court did not
mechanically establish federal district courts as
the reviewers of state courts; that is a last resort.
A state which provides an adequate post-conviction hearing under Townsend standards will likely
find that federal judges deal summarily with
prisoner petitions. However, if 1963 was not when
the friction began, this is when it was intensified.
Eight years earlier in 1955 the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had
developed a Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act which would have very likely satisfied the
standards later fixed by the Supreme Court in the
Townsend case. Unfortunately, by 1963 only a
handful of states had responded to this thoughtful,
authoritative and, what is important, non-federal
program of the Uniform Act. It was this lack of an
effective program to press this legislation on the
states which brought on our problem.
The Criminal Justice Project recommendation
for post-conviction remedy standards begins by
acknowledging that the vast majority of these applications for petitions are prepared by prisoners
without the assistance of counsel. It also recog1372 U.S. 293 (1963).

nizes the reality that most of these applications
have no merit. But it also points out the folly of
prosecutors challenging and judges deciding these
petitions on formal or technical grounds for failure
to comply with procedural rules. In the seven years
since the Touwsend case, it has become dear that
to reject an application on such grounds simply
means an appeal or a new petition on another day
with all the attendant waste of time and manpower. The standard therefore urges some very
practical things: that the states provide paper,
pens, typewriters, and reasonable access to law
books and open avenues of communication between
prisoners and the courts.
Then the ABA standards take another step
which twenty years ago would have seemed absurd
to many reasonable people. This step is therecognition of the value of providing trained counselling to
all prisoners on a systematic basis and the use of
lawyers and law students whenever possible
through the cooperation of bar associations, law
schools, and legal aid offices. The ideal program
recommended for the future is even more; it is to
establish a small but continuing staff available to
all prisoners to advise them and to prepare applications in appropriate cases. This many seem unwise,
even now, to many reasonable people unless they
think through the problem, consult our own prior
experience, and consult the experience of other
civilized countries. If they do this I think they
would be persuaded.
Experimental programs in some states, notably
Oregon, and in some federal prisons gave guidance
and inspiration to the Project committee, but my
own observations were reinforced from other
sources. On the Court of Appeals in Washington
where I sat, we had far less contact with this problem than most other federal courts. But such exposure as I had made it very clear to me at an early
date the prisoners with grievances and with little or
nothing constructive to do would never give up
once they knew the doors had been opened to them.
In common with many other judges I concluded
that the sooner the courts explored the merits of
the habeas corpus claims and disposed of the case
with a full hearing, the better it would be for all
concerned.
In this same period I visited a good many prisons
in this country and in various parts of Europe. I
will leave to another day the melancholy contrast
between the intelligent corrections systems of some
European countries and the generality of our own
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systems in this country. While it may make a dent
in our nationalist pride in American institutions, it
should not surprise us that other countries do some
things better than we do. After all, countries like
Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland have
been running prisons for more than a thousand
years. We have been at it as a nation for only one
hundred eighty years. It is perhaps difficult for an
American or an English lawyer, bred on the notion
that the Great Writ of habeas corpus is indispensable to a civilized and free people, to understand how
any system could be fair without it. One can very
quickly find out, however, that with respect to
prisoners in these enlightened northern European
countries there is a very intelligent workable alternative to habeas corpus. I will use Holland to
illustrate this substitute process: there a team of
trained people from the Ministry of Justice, usually
three, 'with backgrounds in law, psychology and
counselling, make regular visits to all institutions
of confinement. Their responsibility is to inquire as
to the basis of the confinement, hear the grievances
of prisoners, and make reports to the Minister of
Justice as to cases which appear to call for some
remedy. In a sense these trained teams are like
bank examiners, or health inspectors. Their method
provides a regular avenue of communication designed to flush out the rare case of miscarriage of
justice and the larger number of cases in which the
prisoner has some valid complaint or deserves reexamination of his sentence. The mere existence of
such an avenue of communication exercises a very
beneficial influence which is in many respects far
superior to our habeas corpus process.
With us, the prisoner hopes that some distant
proceeding before a remote judge will enable him
to have his cries heard; with them, the prisoner
meets face to face with trained counselors who give
him a sympathetic hearing, ask questions, make a
record of his complaints, and bring his valid
grievances to the attention of higher authority. In
their greater experience with prisons and prisoners
they have become patient and tolerant of human
frailty. They know that people confined want freedom and that they will complain and press for
freedom whether they deserve it or not. In their
wisdom they also know-and we must learn-that
prisoners who do not complain are often the truly
lost souls who have surrendered and cannot be
restored.
I must be sure to avoid the risk of having it
thought that I have suggested, or even hinted,
that we should abandon the Great Writ or mod-
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ify it in any way. Perhaps in our understandable
pride in our own institutions we may have overrated our own system here and there. But we need
not and should not abandon or even modify habeas
corpus. What we need is to strengthen and supplement it with flexible, sensible working mechanisms adapted to the modern condition of overcrowded and understaffed prisons. If we read the
history of the Great Writ going back to Magna
Carta, we will readily see that it was never designed for the needs of a country with more than
two hundred thousand prisoners scattered over
fifty states. It is good but it is not good enough,
and for a great volume of cases it is not efficient.
One thing more: the actual experience in prisons
where these services have been made available to
prisoners is that they file fewer, not more, petitions
with the courts.
Why should I discuss this problem with fifty men
whose individual primary responsibility as an
Attorney General is largely in the area of civil
matters and only to a limited extent (or not at all)
in the criminal area? There are several reasons:
1. As Attorney General, each of you holds the
highest legal office in your state, and you have
an influence and a standing equaled only by
that of the Governor and the Chief Justice of
your state.
2. You have a special standing with the legal
profession, with the courts, and with the
public.
3. In the state systems you are, whether you like
it or not, the nearest thing we have to a Minister of Justice.
4. You have an overview of all that goes on
within your state in the administration of
justice.
From this vantage point I suggest to you-indeed
I urge--that you use the power and the prestige of
your office, your standing with your legislature,
your leadership among lawyers, to lead your state
in all matters relating to an improved system of
justice. I would urge you to begin by taking one
step in this crucial area I have been discussing,
that is, to develop by rules of court, by legislation,
by the rule-making process, or by whatever means
is available, a simple and workable procedure by
which every person in confinement who has, or
who thinks he has, a grievance or complaint can be
heard promptly, fairly and fully in the state courts.
If this is done properly, one hearing will very likely
dispose of the matter.
I predict that if you will undertake this task,
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whether it is within or without your official duties,
you will reduce the flood of federal-state cases to a
small stream, you will help those who must operate
the prisons and you will relieve one of the most
unhappy tensions between the states and the
federal courts and restore state supreme courts to
their rightful place as the primary arbiters of the
state cases.
If this sounds like a call to reform, so be it. As
lawyers we would perhaps prefer a term like re-

shape, or revise, but by whatever name, you as
lawyers should help lead the way and few are in a
better position than you. If changes and improvements are to be left only to judicial power, that
power must be-of necessity-adapted to the
means available, crude, awkward and inefficient
instrument as that may be. If truly efficient means
are to be found, the task must not be placed on
busy judges but on the deliberate process of large
and representative segments of the profession.

